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Fiduciary Duties: A Tale of Problematic Principles,
Imagined Facts and Inefficient Outcomes
RuthefordB Campbell,Jr.'
INTRODUCTION

in this country.
maturity
during the last two decades, a period of significant and notorious corporate
managerial failures.
The deterioration in the standards by which we measure the
appropriateness of the actions of corporate managers2 has been fueled
by influential judges' and scholars' ("Advocates"'), who vigorously-and
seemingly quite effectively-argue in favor of a lax fiduciary duty regime
for corporate managers.
Normative justifications for lax corporate fiduciary duty standards,
are at an all-time low
duty standards
in standards has come to full
the deterioration
C Ironically, fiduciary
ORPORATE

i James and Mary Lassiter Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
The author thanks David Anderson, Doug Branson, James Cox, Chris Frost, Frank Gevurtz,
Doug Michael and Allan Vestal for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 My term, "managers," includes both officers and directors of the company. See infra
notes 9 and 79 (discussing the extent to which officers and directors should be subject to the
same fiduciary duties).
3 See, e.g., William T Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of
Review ofDirector Due Care with Delaware PublicPolicy: A CritiqueofVan Gorkom and Its Progeny
as a StandardofReview Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 449,449-50 (2002) (justifying a lax standard

of review as eliminating "liability risks that are disproportionate to the benefits of service" and
as reducing judicial intrusiveness that "prolongs litigation without offsetting social utility").
4 See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers andthe Marketfor Corporate Control, 73 J. POt. ECON.
110,

12 (1965) ("[Tihe market for corporate control gives ...

shareholders both power and

protection commensurate with their interest in corporate affairs.").
5 For convenience, I use the term "Advocates" for those who propose and support rules
that result in lax fiduciary standards for corporate managers. I do not mean to imply that
scholars who would support one particular rule necessarily support other rules. For example,
in Part I of this Article, I discuss a rule that relaxes or eliminates managers' duty of care, and
in Part II, I discuss a rule that permits managers to facilitate unlimited wealth transfers that
benefit non-shareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders. Scholars who support
the relaxation of fiduciary standards discussed in Part I may or may not support the relaxation
in fiduciary standards discussed in Part II.
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however, are weak. The justifications fail to provide a persuasive reason
to abandon the economic principle more widely applied in society: to hold
actors accountable for the full economic loss caused by their actions as a
way to incentivize efficient conduct.'
The weaknesses in the Advocates' arguments have not escaped
the attention of scholars, who have mustered convincing rebuttals to a
significant portion of the Advocates' claims.' Scholars have failed, however,
adequately to address two of the arguments the Advocates offer in support
of lax standards for corporate managers.' These two arguments appear to
be the most effective theoretical barriers to achieving efficient corporate
fiduciary duty standards-standards that will create an incentive for
efficient conduct on the part of corporate managers.
The first of the Advocates' inadequately challenged arguments is
that corporate managers should not be held accountable for a lack of due
care in their decisions. The Advocates justify this position by a claim that
eliminating any duty of care provides an incentive for managers to take
value-creating risks.9 The second argument of the Advocateso is that
managers should be free to allocate and re-allocate unlimited amounts
of corporate wealth among various corporate stakeholders; the Advocates
justify this position by a claim that such a rule provides an incentive for the
investment of efficient levels of firm-specific capital by those who provide
6 While an award of damages for economic losses is common in society, such awards may
often fall short of "full" economic losses. Tort recoveries are a good example. Tort defendants
are typically liable for failure to prevent inefficient accidents, but the recoveries in such instances may be limited to amounts that are less than the plaintiffs' full economic loss. See, e.g.,
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 192-98 (6th ed. 2003).
7 Two more recent articles are especially noteworthy in this regard. See Renee M. Jones,
Law, Norms, andthe Breakdown ofthe Board: PromotingAccountability in CorporateGovernance,92
IowA L. REV. 105, 119-21 (2oo6) (arguing, interalia, that market forces and social norms do not
efficiently restrain mismanagement by corporate managers); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Director
Inattention and DirectorProtection under Delaware General CorporationLaw Section ioz(B)(7):
A ProposalforLegslative Reform, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 695, 702-o6 (2oo8) (discussing how behavioral psychology research demonstrates the effectiveness of negative reinforcement as a
motivator). An example of an important earlier work is Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance,
Agency Costs,andthe Rhetoric of Contract,85 COLuM. L. REV. 1403, 1420-27 (1985), which argues
that competition for corporate managers and in the securities market fails adequately to limit
managerial misconduct.
8 See discussion infra Parts I and II.
9 See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 3, at 452 ("[I]f the risk of liability is disproportionate
to the directors' incentives for service, directors may avoid making economically valuable
decisions that might subject them to litigation risk." (citation omitted)); id. ("[A] rationality
standard gives directors greater freedom to make risky decisions." (citation omitted)); see also
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting out of Fiduciary Duties:A Response to the AntiContractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1,53-54 (1990) (noting that negligence liability "places a substantial business risk on managers who, unlike the shareholders, are unable to reduce the risk
by diversification and are therefore relatively inefficient risk-bearers" (citations omitted)).
Io See supranote 5.
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monetary and human capital to corporations."
The effect of freeing managers from any duty of care and removing
limitations on their right to transfer wealth among corporate stakeholders,
especially when considered together, is to reduce significantly the
accountability of corporate managers for their actions. This, in turn,
encourages managerial shirking, under-management, mismanagement, and
expropriation of excessive amounts of corporate values or rents.
The broad purpose of this Article is to argue in favor of, and offer economic
justifications for, a robust fiduciary standard for corporate managers. More
specifically, I address the two unchallenged and seemingly effective
arguments of the Advocates for allowing corporate managers to act without
accountability for the full economic loss caused by their mismanagement.
My intent is to show that the normative justifications offered by the
Advocates in support of their arguments are founded on several essential
factual assumptions that are unproven empirically, counterintuitive and,
when unpacked and closely analyzed, seem highly improbable. In short,
the factual assumptions offered in support of the Advocates' arguments
amount to a thin reed and do not meet the burden that should be required
of those who propose abandoning or broadly limiting corporate managerial
accountability.
A strong version of corporate fiduciary duties promotes efficient and
fair outcomes. Accountability on the part of corporate managers for their
actions and decisions is integral to achieving these positive results. Without
a regime that includes strong fiduciary duties and accountability for the
full value of economic loss that results from managers' decisions, achieving
efficiency and fairness is less likely.

1.

NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ELIMINATION OF THE DUTY OF CARE

The Advocates argue that corporate managers-directors, as opposed
to officers, are usually the focus of their attention "-should be subject to
II See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw,
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, BadandNot-So-BadAtgumentsforSharholder Primacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 189, 1200-05 (2002).
12 As will become apparent in this paper, the Advocates focus mostly on the matter of the
fiduciary duties of directors. In light of the justifications the Advocates offer, however, their
rules respecting fiduciary duties would seem equally applicable to officers and directors. See
infra notes 27-28, 7 1-8o and accompanying textual discussion. Over the years, however, commentators have disagreed about the extent to which officers and directors are and should be
subject to identical fiduciary duties. One aspect of this disagreement has involved the extent
to which the business judgment rule is applicable to corporate officers. Compare Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, CorporateOfficers andthe BusinessJudgment Rule, 6o Bus. LAW. 439,44 1 (2005) (application of the business judgment rule to officers' actions "is not firmly established in case law"),
and id.at 44o ("the business judgment rule . . . should not be extended to corporate officers
in the same broad manner in which it is applied to directors"), with Lawrence A. Hamermesh
& A. Gilchrist Sparks III, CorporateOffwers andthe Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor
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an extremely lax, or essentially no, duty of care. This position was wellcaptured by Chancellor Allen in In re Caremark InternationalInc. Derivative
3
Litigation.1
The opinion states:
[A] director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined
by reference to the content of the boarddecision that leads to a corporate loss,
apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process
employed. That is, whether a judge or jury considering the matter after the
fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending
through "stupid" to "egregious" or "irrational", provides no ground for
director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed
was either rational or employed in a goodfaith effort to advance corporate
interests.14
Chancellor Allen's articulation of the duty of care divides along a
traditional business judgment analysis, separating the duty of care into
process and decision and assigning different substantive standards to each
of those two parts." With regard to process, which is usually thought of as
the duty of the decision-maker to inform herself fully before making the
decision, the obligation under Chancellor Allen's formulation is violated
only if the decision-maker acted in bad faith.'" At the point of the actual
Johnson, 6o Bus. LAw. 865, 870 (2005) ("[Tlhere can be little dispute ... that the application
of the business judgment rule to officer action ... is well established in the case law."), andid.
("[Ilt is ordinarily appropriate to apply the business judgment rule to officers."). In Bernard
S. Sharfman, The EnduringLegacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 287, 296 n.53
(zoo8), the author finds "a strong argument that the decisions made by officers, where authority is granted through board delegation (non-board centralized authority), deserve just as
much protection as decisions made by the board."
13 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
14 Id. at 967.

15 This approach--dividing the business judgment rule into the investigation stage and
the decision-making stage-is consistent with the traditional approach taken, for example,
in the PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE] (articulating the business judgment standard as requiring the director or officer
at the process stage to be "informed ... reasonably" and to make decisions "rationally" believing them to be "in the best interests of the corporation").
The significant deterioration in the standards respecting the duty of care is apparent
when one compares the PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE with Caremark.The Principles
require the manager at the process stage to act reasonably while the Caremark language imposes only a good faith duty. At decision-making, the PRINCIPLES impose a "rationally" criterion, which may be equivalent to a gross negligence standard. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra § 4.01 cmt. f. Cartmark imposes no standard at decision-making. See In r
Caremark,698 A.2d at 967.
16 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, § 4.01 cmt. f. In recent years,
Delaware has had a number of high profile cases dealing with the definition of good (or bad)
faith. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o6 A.zd 27, 62 (Del. zoo6) (defining bad faith as 'intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregardfor one's responsibilities"' or
"'[d]eliberate indifference and inaction in theface of a duty to act"' (quoting In re Walt Disney
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making of the decision by the corporate manager, there is no applicable
substantive duty. The decision-maker can thus "never" be held liable for a
loss caused by a managerial decision, even, in the words of the court, if the
decision is "stupid ... egregious or irrational.""

It is apparent that such an articulation essentially eliminates any duty
of care on the part of corporate managers. So articulated, only process is
subject to any standard, and that standard is so lax that only bad faith can
violate the duty of process.
The idea that corporate managers should not be subject to a robust
duty of care standard, and thus have no or limited financial accountability
for harm caused by their actions, flies straight in the face of traditional
economic analyses. Generally, economists assume that actors are rational
and respond accordingly to both positive and negative stimuli." For
example, saddling a defendant with liability for tort damages equal to the
full economic loss of the plaintiff is seen to encourage efficient behavior on
the part of the defendant. The analysis is founded on the notion that the
negative stimulus generated by the threat of monetary liability provides an
incentive for the defendant's investment in efficient accident reduction.
Similarly, in the areas of criminal law and criminal penalties, economists may
analyze potential criminals as "rational calculators" who choose to commit
crimes by weighing the positive stimuli (for example, the probability of
getting money in a robbery) against the probability of negative stimuli (for
example, the probability of getting caught and punished)."
This traditional economic approach is readily applicable to the area of
corporate fiduciary duties and offers an economic basis for holding managers
personally liable for breaches of their fiduciary duty of care. The negative
stimulus generated by the risk of personal liability encourages managers
to act with efficient levels of care. Conversely, the elimination of, or an
extreme reduction in, the standard of care applicable to corporate managers
reduces their incentive to act with efficient levels of care toward the end
of maximizing the interests of the corporation or its owners. Without a
standard of care, managers' irresponsible actions generate consequences
that no longer involve monetary penalties or judicial rebukes for the
managers. This, accordingly, reduces the negative stimulus for managers
to act in ways that further the best interests of the beneficiaries of the
managers' duties.z0
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2oo5))).
17 In re Caremark,698 A.zd at 967 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 17-21.
19 See, e.g., id. at 215-17.
2o Even those who argue in favor of a more lax standard of care generally recognize this
point. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Dorine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 103 (2004) ("A complete theory of the firm thus requires that the law balance the virtues of discretion against the need to require that discretion be used responsibly."

236

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99

Notwithstanding the apparent logic of this approach, Advocates have
argued over the years that corporate managers should be free from any
meaningful duty of care and financial accountability for harm caused by
For example, Advocates have claimed that the
their mismanagement."
fiduciary duty of care is unnecessary, since economic forces in various
markets and social norms provide corporate managers with adequate
incentives for efficient conduct." Scholars, most recently Professors

(citation omitted)); Sharfman, supra note 12, at 307 ("fiduciary duties help to minimize irresponsible behavior and unnecessary error"). Two authors, however, suggest that "liability
rules play a relatively minor role in assuring contractual performance by corporate managers
in publicly-held corporations." Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role ofLiability Rules
and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoreticaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 263 (1986). A contrary view is offered by Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the
Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REV. 393,
395 (2oo5) ("legal liability represents an essential mechanism for ensuring directors' fidelity
to their fiduciary duties").
21 Professor Langevoort describes the arguments that have been offered to support a
rejection of a rigorous standard of care, which include "overprecaution, refusals of good people
to serve, demands for increased insurance, indemnification rights, and compensation for the
residual risk." Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of CorporateBoards: Law, Norms, and
the UnintendedConsequences of Independence andAccountability, 89 GEo. L.J. 797, 8 18 (2oo I ) (citation omitted); id. at 826-28. Bernard Sharfman lists some of the "many good reasons" offered
for a lax standard of care to include:
(s) ensuring that directors are not held liable for honest mistakes of
judgment; (2) encouraging individuals to become directors by protecting
them from liability for decisions that turn out badly; (3) the desire, from
a policy perspective, "Itlo avoid undesirable judicial intervention" in the
affairs of a corporation; and (4) the concern that courts will find more
negligence than really exists because of hindsight bias.
Sharfman, supranote 12, at 299 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). In Bainbridge, supra
note 2o, at I19, 122-23, the author offers another justification for a more relaxed standard of
care. Professor Bainbridge argues that if required to interpret and enforce a rigorous standard
of care, judges, who may lack skill and experience in such complex matters, may "shirk" and
develop "heuristic problem-solving decision-making processes." Id. at I19 (citations omitted).
Thus, "rational shareholders will prefer the risk of director error to that of judicial error." Id.

at

122.
22

See, e.g.,

FRANK

H.

EASTERBROOK & DANIEL

R.

FisCHEL,ME ECONOMiC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 4 (1991) ("dynamics of the market drive [corporate managers] to act as if they

had investors' interests at heart"); id. at 95-96 (discussing disciplinary impact of the market
for corporate managers); Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom's Legacy: The
Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraintsand the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 579, 580-82 (2002) (discussing the arguments regarding discipline that may result from
competition in "[miarkets" (e.g., for products, capital, employment and control), "[clontracts
and [oither [pirivate [oirdering," "[Ilaw" (e.g., securities laws), and various societal "Inlorms");
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,6 1.
LEGAL STUD. 251, 262-73 (1977) (discussing disciplinary impact generated by competition in
various markets).
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Elizabeth A. Nowicki 3 and Renee M. Jones, 4 have refuted these claims by
demonstrating the highly problematic factual assumptions underlying the
Advocates' arguments and the need for full accountability as an incentive
for efficient management. 25
One argument in favor of eliminating the duty of care for corporate
managers, however, remains inadequately challenged. It is currently the
most fashionable and effective defense for the Advocates' position that
corporate managers should owe their corporation and its shareholders no
duty of care.
In this argument, the Advocates contend that a strict standard of care
will lead to bad outcomes by inhibiting the managerial risk-taking that
creates value for the corporation and its shareholders. 6 The idea is that
managers who are fearful that a bad outcome from a corporate investment
may result in their being sued personally by shareholders will, if subject
to a strict duty of care, forego a risky corporate investment, even if the
investment is profitable or value creating for the corporation and its
shareholders." Rational shareholders, therefore, will actually prefer a no
duty of care regime, since it provides an incentive for the managers of their
corporation to create value on their behalf.
23 See Nowicki, supra note 7, at 702-06 (discussing the work of behavioral psychologists,
which supports the conclusion that negative reinforcement (personal liability) influences conduct of corporate managers).
24 Professor Jones recounts the long-standing claims that market forces and social
norms provide corporate managers with sufficient incentives. She successfully demonstrates,
through her use of prior scholarship and her own insights, a convincing refutation of those
claims. Jones, supranote 7, at 118-21 (discussing discipline from market forces); id. at 121-44
(discussing the claim that social norms provide an incentive for corporate managers to engage
in efficient conduct).
25 Earlier, powerful rebuttals of such claims were offered by notable commentators, such
as Professor Victor Brudney. See Brudney, supra note 7, at 1420-27.
26 See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GuHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINEss ORGANIZATION 254 (3d ed. 2oo9) ("Directors who risk liability for making unreasonable decisions ... are likely to behave in a risk-averse manner that
harms shareholders."); R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks,Jr., RejudgingtheBusinessJudgment

Rule, 48 Bus. LAW. 1337, 1342 (1993) ("motivating [directors] to be willing to take entrepre-

neurial risks" is a "persuasive" reason for a lax standard of care).
27 In Joy v. North, Judge Ralph Winter wrote:
Although the [business judgment] rule has suffered under academic
criticism, it is not without rational basis.
... [B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk,
it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create
incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions.... Shareholders can
reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of
the diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may
well be the best choice since great losses in some stocks will over time
be offset by even greater gains in others....
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This argument, however, does not stand up well to a critical analysis.
The numerous essential factual assumptions necessary to support this
justification for a no-standard-of-care regime are unproven and, when
analyzed closely, seem highly improbable.
In considering whether any rule encourages directors to take valuecreating risks, it is important, first, to appreciate the type of risk taking that
benefits the corporation and its shareholders. This, in turn, requires an
understanding of the basic economic concepts of volatility and expected
value.
In economic terms, a volatile investment is one with a wide dispersion
of outcomes, such as an investment with a 50% chance of achieving a value
of $100 and a 50% chance of achieving a value of $0. The expected value
of that investment is $50, which amounts to (.5 x $100) + (.5 x $0).2
No one argues in favor of incentivizing managers to pay $75 to accept
that high risk investment opportunity. Obviously, because the expected
value of that investment is only $50, paying $75 for the investment would
not be in the best interests of the company or its shareholders. On the
other hand, if the managers are offered that investment for $25, it would
seem to be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders for
managers to purchase that investment.
Using the previous investment illustration to restate the position of
those proposing an elimination of corporate managers' duty of care, the
Advocates argue that managers operating under a rigorous standard of care
are incentivized to reject that potentially profitable investment because of
the high probability-50%-of a total loss.29 The Advocates contend that
in such circumstances, if there is a total loss-even though the decision to
invest was consistent with the fiduciary duty to maximize the wealth of
shareholders-shareholders will sue, claiming that the directors violated
their duty of care.3" Managers, therefore, fearing this, will eschew the profit
A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus
may not be in the interest of shareholders generally.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 88o, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).

28 The present value of the investment in this example may be discounted to a sum
below 5o because of the volatility risk. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Impact of Modern
Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRAcusE L. REV. I, 10-13 (2003) [hereinafter Campbell,
The Impact of Modern Finance Theory] (discussing volatility risk, risk premiums and the calculation of risk premiums using the capital asset pricing model). Under popular economic
theory, the extent of the discount depends in large part on the ability of investors to diversify
their total investments. See supra note 27 regarding Judge Winter's discussion in Joy v. North.
Although, economists generally recognize that diversification cannot eliminate "systematic"
or "market" risk. See Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance Theory, supra, at io (assuming,
arguendo, that investors are fully diversified).
29 See supranote 28 and accompanying textual discussion.
30 See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 3, at 450,455-56; Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 110-15;

Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 573, 573-76;
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maximizing conduct that would have been in the best interests of the
company and its shareholders.'
This argument for elimination of the duty of care, however, is based on
a number of unproven and highly questionable factual assumptions.
While the Advocates claim that a strict duty of care standard generates
an incentive to reject value-maximizing investments in such high volatility
situations, 2 a strict standard also generates an incentive to accept such
investments.
Consider once again the example of an investment opportunity that
costs $25 with a 0.5 probability of a $100 value and a 0.5 probability of a
$0 value, and imagine that managers are operating under a negligence or
reasonable person duty of care. The Advocates contend that managers will
not make the investment because of the personal risk.33 But, consider the
risk managers take under such a strict standard if they unreasonably decide
to reject the investment. An unreasonable failure to accept the investments
means the managers have violated their negligence duty of care standard,
which creates liability for them. This makes it difficult, at least for me, to
conclude that managers operating in a strict regime and pursuing their selfinterests in high volatility, positive value cases would likely elect to pass up
the highly volatile, profitable investment.
In the case of such an investment opportunity, fully informed managers
would be presented with the following options. Their first option would
be to accept the investment, which is an action that is consistent with
their fiduciary duties. Even though they act consistently with their
fiduciary duties, there is a chance that they may be sued or that a court
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage orMisguidedNotion?,67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 287,305-06 (1994) (discussing the Advocates' position generally).
31 It is possible to unpack these claims regarding directors' fears. First, one might assume that directors fear the mere filing of the lawsuit as well as the expense and reputational
damage that occurs as a result. Just the filing would seem certain to generate negative utility
to the average director. ButseeGevurtz, supra note 30, at 31o. Gevurtz suggests that the risk of
litigation is overblown, relying on his observations that trial lawyers, who operate in a malpractice regime based on negligence, make countless qualitative decisions but that "challenges
to trial decisions do not constitute the predominant source of legal malpractice claims" even
though "trials inevitably produce losers, thereby providing a steady stream of prospective malpractice plaintiffs." (citation omitted)). Id. At the next level, one might imagine that directors
operating in a rigorous standard of care fear the enhanced likelihood of shareholders/plaintiffs
ability to survive preliminary motions to dismiss, thereby generating significant settlement
value. Finally, directors may fear that they ultimately-and improperly-will be held liable
for a wealth enhancing decision that did not turn out well. Commentators typically rely on the
hindsight bias to explain why directors operating under a strict standard of care are at risk for
such an ultimate outcome. See, e.g., Bainbridge,supra note 20, at 114 ("[Tihere is a substantial
risk that suing shareholders and reviewing judges will be unable to distinguish between competent and negligent management because bad outcomes often will be regarded, ex post, as
having been foreseeable and, therefore, preventable ex ante." (citation omitted)).
32 See supra notes 28 and 3o and accompanying textual discussions.
33 See supra notes 28 and 3o and accompanying textual discussions.
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may, albeit wrongly, conclude that their decision was negligent and hold
them personally liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. The managers' other
option when operating under a strict standard of care and presented with
a high volatility, positive value investment is to reject the investment,
which will amount to a breach of their fiduciary duty. If they are sued as a
result of rejecting the investment and a court reaches a proper decision, the
managers will be found to have violated their duty of care and will be held
personally liable.
While certainly this is a polemic about the facts, if I were a manager
pursuing only my own self-interests in such a case, I am certain what I
would do: I would accept the value-creating investment and run the risk of
a groundless suit and a wrong outcome. I would conclude that on balance I
would be less likely to face personal disutility if I were to follow the law.34
My view of the facts, therefore, suggests that on balance, a strict standard
is likely to move managers to act in a way that creates value in such high
volatility cases."
Now consider the other example-an offer to purchase for $75 a highly
volatile investment with an expected value of $50. Managers operating
under a negligence regime have, once again, a strong incentive to make the
value-maximizing decision, which obviously is to reject the investment. If
managers unreasonably accept the investment, they violate the standard of
34 I would, of course, attempt to limit my exposure by a decision-making apparatus that
would enhance the probability that I could demonstrate my due diligence, which, of course,
enhances the probability of a sound decision.
35 In such a case, one may argue that directors operating under a strict standard of care
have an incentive to reject the high volatility, positive value offers in order to avoid the risk of
liability based on an unfounded suit, and then to conceal their decision in order to avoid the
risk of liability from a well-founded suit. Again, this scenario seems problematic. First, it is
not at all clear how often directors face positive value transactions with volatility so high that
it would influence their actions. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying textual discussion.
If such cases are rare, there is not an economic incentive for directors to establish the system
necessary to conceal their breaches of their fiduciary duties. Second, establishing a system to
implement the strategy would be expensive for directors as well as for others who may face
professional and legal liability for their participation. Considering directors, the question is
the extent to which directors would be willing to participate in a system of corporate governance that subverts both value-creating decisions that they are obligated to make and the
requirement that they act on a fully informed basis. A below-the-radar-screen process to deal
with high volatility, positive value cases would seem to involve the directors in a dangerous
situation. It seems quite likely, for example, that any lawsuit alleging a breach of fiduciary
duty would uncover the system. It also would involve directors in a situation that, at least
one must hope, is morally distasteful to them. Deploying such a system would seem likely
also to involve the assistance of legal counsel, which will raise a significant professional issue
for the corporation's lawyer. Lawyers' professional, ethical standards oblige them to act in
the best interests of their client, which is the corporation, and not its officers or directors. See
Rutheford B Campbell,Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation ofTransactional Lawyers
to Actas Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERs L. REV. 9, 17 (2003) ("[A] lawyer representing a corporation..
. represents the corporate entity itself and does not... represent any of the constituents of the
corporation such as the directors [or] officers .... " (citations omitted)).
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care and are liable. With no duty of care obligation, however, the personal
liability incentive of corporate managers to do the right thing-to reject the
investment-is lost. Managers could accept the investment without risk
of any liability. 6 Once again, the strict standard of care provides the better
incentive for efficiency."
The notion, therefore, that a rigorous standard ofcare, such as negligence,
provides an incentive to engage in conduct that is contrary to the best
interests of the corporation and shareholders seems highly problematic.
An even more obvious failure of the Advocates' argument in favor of
a no-or-extremely-lax standard of care, however, is in the apparent but
unarticulated factual assumption regarding the prevalence of managerial
decisions involving high risk, positive value matters. While essentially all
management decisions involve some volatility in outcome," the negative
impact upon which the Advocates base their argument occurs only in those
decisions where the volatility is so high that managers are inclined to reject
value creating investments.
For the argument of the Advocates in favor of a no-or-extremely-lax duty
of care regime to be persuasive, corporate managers in a significant number
of their decisions must face situations involving a positive expected value
with volatility so high that they will fail to take the right path for fear of
personal liability. Such cases must be sufficiently prevalent so that the total,
overall gains from eliminating managers' inefficient, non-value maximizing
decisions in such high volatility cases outweigh the increased agency costs
generated by an elimination of or extreme reduction in the standard of
care.
Not only are such decisions not prevalent, they, indeed, seem to occur
quite infrequently. Relying on my own experiences as a law professor, a
transactional lawyer providing counsel to corporations, and a member of
boards of directors for profit and not-for-profit corporations, I am hard
pressed to think of an instance growing out of these experiences in which
a profitable investment or decision was so volatile that fear of liability

36 Under the rational assumption that the time required to make a careful decision is
greater than the time required to make a casual decision, a no-liability regime incentivizes the
decision maker (corporate manager, in our case) to make a poorly considered decision. With
no liability for a poorly made decision, the incentive of the corporate manager is to reduce his
opportunity costs (loss of leisure time, for example) by devoting less time to considering and
analyzing the decision.
37 This is another example of the point developed earlier in this paper. See supra notes
28-34 and accompanying textual discussion. The gains envisioned by the Advocates are limited to cases in which volatility is so high that managers will not make the value maximizing
decision. The reduced duty of care standard, however, applies to all decisions made by corporate managers. This makes it difficult to conclude that their regime generates net efficiency
gains.
38 See Campbell, The Impact ofAfodern FinanceTheory, supra note 28, at io- i (describing
the impact of "risk" on present value).

242

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99

impacted a board's action. While certainly this sometimes occurs,39 my
own experiences suggest strongly that the vast majority of decisions by
managers are made on the basis of expected value, not volatility.
Consider, in that regard, the types of decisions that particular managers
make. Directors, for example, make decisions regarding hiring of senior
officers, compensation for senior officers, granting stock options for senior
management, approving major investments (in technology, capital assets,
real estate, etc.), approving acquisitions, and selling major assets or divisions.
These types of decisions seem overwhelmingly to be the types of decisions
that managers make on the basis of expected value and infrequently to
involve circumstances in which the best deal for the company involves
such high volatility risk that directors would be inclined to make a nonvalue maximizing decision.
The prevalence of decisions involving valuable but highly volatile
investments is obviously important in measuring the net gain (or loss)
generated by an abandonment of a rigorous duty of care obligation. The
Advocates propose an across the board reduction in the standard of care,
which means that every decision of managers would operate without the
negative incentive provided by a rigorous standard of care and liability
for a violation of that standard of care. The gains they envision, however,
will be generated-at least if my factual reckoning is correct-in very few
instances. This makes it even more difficult to imagine facts that support
the position of the Advocates.
The Advocates, therefore, are unpersuasive regarding two factual
assumptions, both of which are essential to support their argument in
favor of a no-or-lax duty of care regime. First, in high volatility cases, it
seems likely that a strict duty of care provides more incentive to make
value creating decisions than does a no-or-limited duty of care. Second,
there are very few cases where the volatility risk is so high that it would
cause managers operating under a strict duty of care to make the wrong
decision.
Concluding that the Advocates are wrong in their factual assumptions
destroys their normative justification for a no duty of care regime. Their
failure in that regard, however, does not by itself determine the appropriate
level of care for corporate managers. The question remains: What is an
39 Of course, it can happen that a positive value investment opportunity involving a
highly volatile outcome could cause managers to eschew the investment. In an acquisition
setting, for example, a corporation may be offered a take it or leave it deal at $ioo, and the
company's financial advisers may tell the board that if they loose that offer, there is a 50%
chance of a deal at $6o and 50% chance of a deal at $i6o. In that high volatility situation,
a board may be inclined to take the $ioo offer in lieu of shopping for a better deal with a
higher expected value. My factual polemic with the Advocates is based on my opinion that
these situations occur infrequently, and certainly not with sufficient prevalence to generate
the gains necessary to offset the losses caused by applying a no-or-extremely-lax standard of
care to all management decisions.

20IO-20I I11

PROBLEMATIC PRINCIPLES

243

efficient level of care to impose on corporate managers?
The starting point in deciding what, if any, standard of care leads to
pleasing outcomes is the familiar economic notion that in the absence
of negative externalities parties should be permitted to fashion their
own arrangements.40 The logical extension of that notion, which once
again is familiar, is that society, in formulating its rules, generally is able
to promote efficiency and fair outcomes through rules that approximate
the arrangements that parties would make in most cases. 4' Applying this
analysis, an efficient standard of care is the standard that corporate owners
and managers would agree on in most cases.
While it certainly is a daunting task-more likely, an impossible
task-to provide a definitive answer to the question of what standard of
care is efficient, some scholars-much to their credit-have attempted to
generate empirical evidence on this matter. These scholars have examined
the circumstances surrounding the adoption by states and corporations of
provisions that limit directors' monetary liability. The statutes, which have
been widely adopted by states42 and widely approved and implemented by
corporations, 43 permit a corporation in its articles of incorporation to limit
directors' monetary liability to the corporation to actions "not in good faith"
or involving "intentional misconduct."" Because shareholders are required
to vote on these amendments to the company's articles of incorporation,
some scholars suggest that the approval of these provisions by corporate
shareholders should be seen as an expression by shareholders of a
40 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 6, at 71; Richard A. Posner, The Ethical andPoliticalBasis of
the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication,8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) (offering a moral
defense for the pursuit of economic efficiency based on the consent of the parties).
41 Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Bumping Along the Bottom: Abandoned Principlesand Failed
FiduciaryStandards in Unform PartnershepandLLC Statutes, 96 Ky. L.J. 163, 170 (2008) [hereinafter Campbell, BumpingAlong the Bottom] ("Even where the transaction will occur, a societal
rule that mimics the arrangement that most of the parties would select in most cases may
promote efficiency by eliminating the need of the parties to bargain and thereby reduce transaction costs. The next principle, therefore, is that in instances where constructing their own
terms is inefficient or impossible for parties, society ought to enact broadly applicable rules
consistent with those that the parties in most circumstances would select, if they were able to
bargain." (citation omitted)).
42 Overwhelmingly, states have adopted these limited liability statutes. See Roberta
Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the InsuranceCrisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 116o
(199o) [hereinafter Romano, Corporate Governance] ("Within two years [of Delaware's adoption of a limited liability statute], forty-one states . . . amended their corporation statutes to
reduce directors' liability....").
43 Companies widely have amended their articles of incorporation to adopt the limited
liability provisions for directors. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why Ido not Teach Van Gorkom,
34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2ooo) (reporting 98 out of ioo from a sample of Fortune 500 companies had such provisions).
44 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 1oz(b)(7) (West, Westlaw through 20o0) (limiting
directors' liability for monetary damages to "acts . .. not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law... ").
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preference for a very low standard of care.4 1 Predictably and convincingly,
however, other scholars discount the significance of these actions, citing
"management domination of the approval process and the severe problems
of collective action confronted by shareholders."*
Professor Roberta Romano, pursuing a more sophisticated empirical
path, used "conventional financial econometric techniques" to examine the
stock market's reaction to the adoption of these limited liability provisions."
She looked at the stock market's reaction when Delaware adopted its
limited liability statute and again when particular firms adopted limited
liability amendments to their articles of incorporation. 48 Her idea was that,
"[i]f investors believe that directors are deterred by the duty of care (that
liability for negligence has a positive effect on stockholders' wealth), then
a firm's shares will experience significant negative abnormal returns when
49
the market learns of plans to adopt a limited liability provision."
While Professor Romano found some evidence of "significantly negative
cumulative abnormal returns"s0 (CARs) in studies looking at the impact of
the limited liability provisions on companies' stock prices, based on her
own work and that of others, as well as considering the data as a whole, she
concluded that "the event study data provide[d] no convincing support for
a perceived deterrent effect from directors' liability for negligence.""i
45 See Sharfman, supra note 12, at 289 (Delaware statute limiting director liability gave
"shareholders ... the opportunity to veto the Van Gorkom decision if they found it was not in
their best interests. And veto they did.").
46 J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractanans, Waiver of
Liability Provisions,andtheRace to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 287 (2009) (citation omitted).
Brown and Gopalan also make a powerful point that, in light of the fact that amendments to
articles of incorporation must first be approved by the board of directors, "once management
obtains adoption, the provision remains in place, irrespective of the wishes of shareholders,
until management decides to initiate a change." Id.
47 Romano, CorporateGovernance,supra note 42, at Ii 83.
48 Id. at 116o-6i.
49 Id. at I183.
50 Id. at

i187.

51 Id. at 1187-88. Professor Romano first looked at the impact on a company's stock price
when the company adopted a limited liability amendment. While she reported one study
that found "significantly negative cumulative abnormal return[]" (CAR) in connection with
firms' adoption of a limited liability provision, based on her own studies and those of others,
she concluded that "[tihe data ... do not provide support for such deterrent effect [of duty
of care lawsuits]." Id. at 1183. She dismissed the contrary study as "[an arbitrarily chosen
significant statistic amidst a mass of insignificant ones ..... Id. at j184. Again, using econometric techniques, she also looked at the impact of the adoption of Delaware of its limited
liability statute on a portfolio of seventy Delaware firms. In these data, she found abnormal
negative returns, some of which were statistically significant. These data she characterized
as "the only evidence that supports a general deterrent role for duty of care lawsuits." Id. at
i86. Considering the data as a whole, she concluded that "the event study data provide no
convincing support for a perceived deterrent effect from directors' liability for negligence."
Id.at i187-88.
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Some may consider Professor Romano's data a bit more ambiguous. In
all events, however, there are reasons-other than a shareholder preference
for a lax standard of care-that might explain why the adoption of limited
liability provisions may not generate negative cumulative abnormal returns
in stock prices.
The most obvious reason is that investors may view limiting directors'
monetary liability to only highly culpable acts as changing almost nothing.
The starting point-the standard of care imposed on directors before the
enactment and adoption of the limited liability provisions-may be viewed
by investors as so low that the new limited liability standard changed very
little." For example, in Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court stated
that the duty of care involved only the obligation to engage in a process
that met a good faith standard." This is essentially the same standard of
M
If the market viewed the
care adopted in the limited liability statutes.Caremark standard as applicable immediately, before the adoption of the
statute, the statute and its adoption by corporations amounted to no change
in the standard of care.
In short, there is little empirical data supporting the notion that an
extremely lax standard of care is an efficient, value-creating regime that
would be preferred by corporate shareholders. In identifying an efficient
standard of care, therefore, we are relegated to logic and analysis informed
by common experiences. This approach suggests that a robust duty
of care amounts to an efficient fiduciary standard, the standard that the
parties would agree upon in most cases if they were fully informed, able
to bargain with one another, and able to exercise market options. In such
circumstances, it seems unlikely that investors and managers in most cases
would agree on fiduciary duties that are paltry, anemic, or, in the most
extreme case, nonexistent.
My conclusion on this matter is based on the following assumptions and
analyses.
It seems axiomatic that when investors provide capital and assume a
passive role in the management of that capital, their strong preference is
for sound and reasonable management and accountability. A strong version
52 Professor Romano's data may offer some support for the theory that Delaware's standard of care was so low that the limited liability statutes changed nothing. Her research in the
late 198os suggests, for example, that previously decided duty of care cases brought as derivative suits usually did not result in significant recovery or settlement in favor of the company.
See id.at I168 ("[Duty of care] suits rarely result in a financial recovery .... The only monetary
recovery in the vast majority of settled duty of care suits is plaintiffs' attorneys' fees . . .
These data may be consistent with a very low, legally enforced standard of care.
53 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996); see
supra notes 13-17 and accompanying textual discussion.
54 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § Io2(b)(7) (West, Westlaw through 2010) (Limiting
directors' liability for monetary damages to "acts ... not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.").
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of corporate fiduciary duties provides the incentive for good management,
and thus in that regard is attractive to investors.
The fact, however, that investors have a preference for sound
management does not establish the efficiency ofa strict duty ofcare standard.
One must consider the cost to investors of acquiring such a heightened
standard of care. Although investors may prefer a strict standard of care,
they may be unwilling to pay the costs of such a high standard., To use
a quantified example, corporate managers may be willing to provide their
services to corporate owners (investors) under a no-or-extremely-lax duty
of care standard for $10, but the managers would demand $20 to operate
under a negligence standard.5 6 In such a situation, although investors may
prefer a negligence standard over a lax standard of care, investors may be
unwilling to pay the extra $10 for their preferred standard, and thus the
parties, if able to bargain, would settle on the no-or-extremely-low duty of
care.
Continuing with this quantified example, the power of corporate
managers to extract additional compensation for their liability under a
negligence standard depends on competition in the management market."
Considering, for example, the market for directors, to the extent there is a
deep supply of capable directors, competition in that market would limit
the power of directors to extract monopolistic returns for their services
under the more rigorous duty of care standard.
It is on this matter that my view of the facts may be remarkably
different from the view of those who argue for lax fiduciary duties. The
factual assumptions indulged by those arguing in favor of lax fiduciary
duties include the assumption that a strict duty of care will make it difficult
or impossible to find competent managers for corporations." Available data
may suggest, however, that there is a deep supply of capable corporate
managers, especially corporate directors.
In today's world, directors of public companies are very well paid.
The annual median compensation for basic board service for the top 100
companies listed on Nasdaq and on the New York Stock Exchange is in
excess of $200,000.59 Data suggests that boards meet eight to ten times per
55 See Campbell, BumpingAlongthe Bottom,supra note 41, at 182.
56 This is often stated in terms of the difficulty of finding competent directors, if they
are subject to large liabilities as a result of a breach of their duty of care. Professor Gevurtz
argues that this is no different from doctors and other professionals. "In fact, a comparison of
actual awards against negligent directors versus other professionals might suggest directors
have little to complain about." Gevurtz, supra note 30, at 313 (citation omitted). While one
may argue that the relative liability risks described by Professor Gevurtz have changed since
his article appeared in 1994, director compensation has also changed. See infra notes 59 and
6o, regarding directors' compensation.
57 See Manne, supra note 4, at i1o, 117-18.
58 See supranote 21 and accompanying textual discussion.
59 FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC., 201o DIRECTOR COMPENSATION: NASDAQ ioo vs.
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year.?
Based on self-reported information, directors estimate that they spend
an average of sixteen hours per month on board business matters, which
includes total time spent on "review and preparation

. . . ,

meeting

attendance and travel." 6
Directorships are very attractive jobs. In addition to the extremely
generous monetary compensation, there are significant non-monetary
benefits in the form of networking, relationship building, and associations
that open doors and advance one's business and personal goals. Not
surprisingly, data suggest that directors are generally very satisfied with
their directorships. 62 Korn/Ferry reports that eighty-six percent of directors
in its 2007 survey are "extremely satisfied" or "very satisfied" as a director.0
Also, forty-six percent of the directors in its survey say their satisfaction has
oo: NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION AT THE loo LARGEST NASDAQ AND
ioo LARGEST NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANIES 7 (20lo), http://www.fwcook.com/
alert_1etters/20 Io_DirectorCompensation_.NASDAQ_ I oo.vsNYSE_ I ooNon-Employee
NYSE

DirectorCompensationat_thej looLargestNASDAQ-and IooLargestNewYork
StockExchangeCompanies.pdf. The 2010 median directors' compensation for basic board
service (not including additional compensation for committee service) was $235,000 for the
oo largest Nasdaq companies and $225,000 for the ioo largest New York Stock Exchange
companies. Id.
6o Id. at 5.The foregoing report assumed eight board meetings and five committee meetings per year. In 2oo6, General Electric directors had ten board meetings, plus committee meetings, and the average compensation for General Electric's non-management board members
that year was approximately $437,357. Gen. Elec. Co., Proxy Statements (Schedule 14A) (Feb.
28, 2007),availableathttp://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4o545/oo0119312507045io/ddefl4a.htm. That same year, Halliburton's directors had nine board meetings, plus committee
meetings, and received average compensation of approximately $310,257. Halliburton Corp.,
Proxy Statement (Schedule I4A) (Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/45o12/0000950129070018o7/h4459iddefl4a.htm.

In 2oo6, one prominent board

member of General Electric, Sam Nunn, former United States Senator from Georgia, received
compensation for his board and committee service of $536,233. Mr. Nunn reported that he
also served on the boards of Chevron, Coca-Cola, and Dell. He reported that he was at the
same time "co-chairman and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the chairman of the
board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies ... [and] distinguished professor
at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech." GEN. ELEC. Co., SCHEDULE
I 4 A, supra.
61 KORN/FERRY INT'L, 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 27 (2008), availableat
hrtp://www.kornferry.com/Publication/9955. A study by Korn/Ferry found that in 2007 direc-

tors of North American corporations reported an average of sixteen hours per month spent
on board matters. In evaluating this, it is important to realize that this was self-reported by
the director and included "review and preparation time, meeting attendance and travel." Id.
Professor Eisenberg published various data from a 2004 study respecting director service. He
concluded: "[clounting in committee time ... the average number of hours a year spent by
the directors on corporate affairs ... [is] around 100." MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 198 (9th ed. 2005)(citing MERCER
HUMAN RESOURCE CONSULTING,

tENDS IN OUTSIDE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION 18 (2004)).

62 KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 61, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).

63 Id.
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"improved" since five years ago."
All of this supports the view that director positions are appealing, and
therefore, it is likely that there is a deep supply of highly capable people
willing to serve as directors for the generous monetary compensation (and
other benefits) received by today's directors for one to two hundred hours
of (self-reported) work per year. When I think about the capable people
I know in my own life-academics, lawyers, bankers, business people,
etc.-I find a deep supply of potential directors. It is this supply that may
make it difficult for managers to exact a significantly higher price for their
services if they were held to a strict standard of care.
Certainly I understand-indeed, I emphasize-that once again the
polemic is about facts, and my view of the facts may not be shared by some.
But, consider the factual assumptions necessary to support a low or nonexistent fiduciary duty of care. One would have to assume that in most
cases fully informed corporate owners (investors or shareholders) who are
able to bargain and exercise market options would turn over their capital
to managers who operate with few or no fiduciary duties and little legal
or financial accountability for mismanagement. The assumptions are that
corporate owners would do this because managers would be able to exact
rents so high that owners would prefer the lack of accountability over the
price of the higher standards. Such factual assumptions, once again, seem
problematic.'

64 Id. at 26.
65 My assumption that the corporation or shareholders are able to bargain with directors
may be considered a weakness in my reckoning on this matter. In any "bargaining" between
the corporation (shareholders) and directors over the pricing of a strict duty of care, the board
of directors itself would to a large extent act on behalf of the corporation (shareholders). This
is a result of the fact that directors set their own salaries, see MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.11
(2oo6), and are able to exert significant control over board nominees and composition. See
id. § 8.o(b). Thus, even though there is a deep supply of potential directors ready to serve
in the event that incumbent directors overprice a strict duty of care, the discipline of such
competition may be diminished, because the board sets its own salaries and has influence
over board composition. An argument may be made, therefore, that the board, in response to
a strict standard of care, may price its services so high that shareholders would be unwilling
to pay the extra expense. There are factors, however, that ameliorate the boards' incentives
to overprice its services. First, shareholders elect directors and thus could refuse to elect directors who overprice their services. Relevant here are the federal proxy rules, which require
extensive disclosures of directors' compensation. See 17 C.ER. § 229.402(k) (20o0) and the
recently adopted proxy access rules, which require a company in some instances to include
shareholders' board nominees in the company's proxy materials, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-i (2009).
Second, because setting their own salary involves directors in a conflict, directors' salary decisions should be subject to the strict fiduciary duty standards under the intrinsic fairness test.
Third, the "say on pay" movement with regard to officer compensation, driven as it is by Rule
14a-8 proposals, 17 C.ER. § 240.14a-8 (2010), may dissuade directors from using a strict duty
of care standard as a basis for paying themselves extremely high salaries. Perhaps even more
to the point, it would seem perverse to justify a lax standard of care based on directors' threats
of using their strategic power to extract rents.
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In summary, the Advocates' arguments in favor of the elimination
or extreme reduction of the duty of care for corporate managers are
unpersuasive. Their facially problematic factual assumption, which is that
managers on the whole will act in more efficient ways if they are subject
to essentially no duty of care and thus no liability or accountability, does
not stand up well to close scrutiny. Instead, the more reasonable factual
assumptions support a negligence or reasonable person standard of care as
more likely to promote efficiency. Traditional economic thought assumes
that persons respond both to positive and negative stimuli. Holding
managers liable for harmful, unreasonable decisions provides appropriate
stimuli for efficient conduct.

11.

NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MANAGERS' RIGHTS TO MAKE
UNLIMITED WEALTH TRANSFERS

The Advocates6 6 argue that directors67 should be permitted to facilitate
transactions that transfer virtually any amount of wealth from one corporate
constituency (or stakeholder) to any other corporate constituency.68 The
66 The most influential scholarly articulation of this position is Blair & Stout, supranote
I I.

67 Professors Blair and Stout, for example, focus their discussion on directors. Blair &
Stout, supra note II. Their arguments support the application of their rule to decisions by
corporate officers as well as directors. See infra note 73 and accompanying textual discussion.
68 The Advocates also argue that, as a positive matter, the law in its present state permits
directors to engage in transactions that involve the transfer of virtually any amount of corporate wealth among corporate constituencies. For example, in Stout, supra note 11, at 1202
(citation omitted), the author opines that the 'revealed preferences"' of Delaware judges
"give[] directors free rein to pursue strategies that reduce shareholder wealth while benefiting
other constituencies." Professors Blair and Stout describe directors' authority to make wealth
transfers among corporate constituencies as "virtually absolute," Blair & Stout, supra note I I,
at 25I, and as involving "tremendous discretion to sacrifice shareholders' interests in favor of
management, employees, and creditors," and as involving "ultimate decision-making [and]
full discretion." Id. at 291-92. Professors Blair and Stout do, however, recognize two limits on
directors' authority to facilitate wealth transfers among corporate constituencies. First, directors are subject to duty of loyalty requirements, which, for example, prohibit their transferring
wealth from other constituencies to themselves by stealing. Nevertheless, Professors Blair
and Stout view the directors' duty of loyalty as applicable "to only a very limited subset of
all the possible situations" involving deep conflicts of interest. Id. at 299. Second, directors,
they believe, are subject to the duty to take actions that benefit the "corporation" as a whole,
which seems to mean the interests of all privileged constituencies as a whole. See id. at 289
(directors' "fiduciary obligations ... run to the firm as a whole"); see also id.at 300 (stating that
there is liability under the business judgment rule "only... where a finding of liability serves
the collective interests of all the firm's members" (citation omitted)). The positive claim of
the Advocates-that directors' fiduciary duty permits unlimited wealth transfers that benefit
non-shareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders-is disputed by other scholars.
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, TheEnd ofHistory for CorporateLaw, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439,468 (2001) ("The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over
its principal competitors is now assured .... [That model has established] duties to serve the
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most contentious application of this rule would empower directors to take
actions that transfer virtually unlimited wealth from shareholders to non.
shareholder constituencies, such as creditors or employees.
The reasoning that the Advocates offer in support of their normative
conclusion starts with the factual assumption that high transaction costs
make it impossible for the various corporate constituencies to draft
complete contracts with the other constituencies.6 As a result, the Advocates
posit, non-shareholder constituencies are unable by means of contract to
protect themselves from rent seeking or expropriative actions by other
constituencies-most likely shareholders. 0 Under the traditional approach
that obligates directors to maximize shareholder wealth, directors have an
incentive to facilitate the expropriation of wealth from the unprotected,
non-shareholder constituencies for the benefit of shareholders." Seeing
this risk of losing the value of their investment, the Advocates believe that
non-shareholder constituencies are unwilling to make efficient levels of
firm-specific capital investment."
Unpacking this line of argument through examples, perhaps workers
would not make firm-specific human capital investments in training,"
perhaps creditors would not loan money to corporations, 4 and perhaps
interests of shareholders alone ... [Tihe standard model of shareholder primacy has always
been the dominant legal model in ... the U.S.");seealso Roberta Romano,A CautionaryNote on
DrawingLessonsfrom ComparativeCorporateLaw, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2031 (1993) (recognizing
that U.S. corporation law seeks to "maximize shareholder wealth").
69 Blair & Stout, supra note iI, at 264 ("[Tlransaction costs and other market imperfections often make it impossible to achieve the required coordination through impersonal individual exchanges in markets or even through a set of explicit contracts." (citation omitted)).
70 Id. at 249-50 ("Yet trying to prevent shirking and rent-seeking by defining individual
team members' duties and rewards through explicit contracts can be impossibly difficult ...
71 A regime that obligates directors to maximize shareholder wealth may in some cases
obligate directors to engage in transactions that do not maximize the total value of all corporate constituencies. This is because a transaction that is neutral with regard to the value of
the whole or, indeed, even reduces the value of the whole, can increase shareholder wealth
by expropriating value from non-shareholder constituencies. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr.,
A Positive Analysis of the Common Law of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 84 Ky. L.J. 455, 460-69
(1996).
72 Blair and Stout, supra note I I, at 292. If a corporate board is controlled by any of the
"corporation's constituencies, that constituency could use its power over the board to seek
rents opportunistically from other members of the productive team, thus discouraging teamspecific investments." Id.
73 Blair and Stout give the following example: "The marketing specialist, for example,
must develop specialized knowledge and personal contacts (firm-specific human capital)
whose value is vulnerable to actions and decisions of the team as a whole-likewise for the
technical specialist." Id. at 276.
74 See id. ("[Wjhile the cash contributions of financial investors may initially be generic
and fungible, once those funds have been used to purchase specialized assets or to pay wages,
they effectively become sunk in the firm." (citation omitted)).
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communities or states would be reluctant to invest in industrial parks
or grant tax breaks as a way of attracting companies to locate in their
areas. Recognizing their firm-specific capital investments are at risk of
expropriation by boards that are required to act in the best interests of
shareholders, those non-shareholder constituencies-workers, creditors,
and communities, in my examples-would consciously decide not to invest
their capital up to an efficient level.
The Advocates' prescription for these problems is to unhook directors
from any legal obligation to act in the best interests of shareholders and,
instead, to allow directors freely to make decisions that redistribute corporate
wealth among the various constituencies." Freeing directors in this way, they
believe, will enable directors to make value-enhancing decisions that will
maximize the total value of all the privileged constituencies 6 and thus lead
to efficient outcomes." Directors, the Advocates believe, are incentivized
to make efficient, value maximizing decisions because of their right to a
reward-apparently directors' fees-consisting of "a nominal share of the
team's output."" Seeing that directors are freed of any legal obligation
or incentive to engage in rent seeking on behalf of shareholders, "team
members"-most importantly, non-shareholder constituencies-"feel they
can .

.

. safely invest" and thus will make efficient investments in firm-

specific capital that the Advocates believe non-shareholder constituencies
would be afraid to make under a traditional regime. 9
75 See id.at 254 (finding that their approach "suggests that directors should not be under
direct control of either shareholders or other stakeholders").
76 Blair and Stout seem to define the privileged constituencies-those constituencies
whose "joint welfare function[s]" should be maximized by a corporate board-as "individuals
who make firm-specific investments" in the company. Id. at 288. "For most public corporations, these are primarily executives, rank-and-file employees, and equity investors, but in
particular cases ... may also include other stakeholders such as creditors, or even the local
community if the firm has strong geographic ties." Id.
77 Id. at 274 (concluding that the total value can be enhanced if shareholders give up control "over the team's assets, as well as the right to allocate output among team members").
78 Id. The authors point out:
Directors are compensated, often quite handsomely, for their
services to the coalition. This gives them an incentive to try to
maintain their positions by satisfying the minimum demands of all of
the important corporate constituencies, lest some critical constituents
withdraw and the coalition fall apart. (After all, if the team falls apart, the
directors lose their jobs.)
Id. at 283 (citation omitted). The authors state that this incentive does not, however, amount
to a "tight constraint." Id. But they also find supplemental incentives for the directors to
"maximize the joint welfare function of all the firm's members" from the "duty of loyalty,"
"severely limiting their abilities to serve their own [interests]" and the "cultural norms of fairness and trust." Id. at 315-16.
79 Id. at 274. This textual discussion demonstrates that the Advocates' rule must apply
to the fiduciary obligations of corporate officers as well as directors. See supra note 67 and
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As is apparent from this discussion, the net efficiency gains that the
Advocates see as generated by their regime depend on a number of factual
assumptions. Although the Advocates are careful not to claim any definitive
empirical evidence in support of their factual assumptions, 0 it is helpful
here to explicate their essential factual underpinnings and to illuminate
the disagreement that one might find concerning their assumed facts.
Consider the factual assumptions necessary for the gains that the
Advocates see in their regime. Three of their assumptions can be grouped
together: (1) that transaction costs prevent non-shareholder constituencies
from protecting their firm-specific investments by contract; (2) that nonshareholder constituencies will recognize their vulnerability to inappropriate
sharing of rents and expropriation of their firm-specific investments; and (3)
that, recognizing this risk, the non-shareholder constituencies will respond
by choosing not to make efficient levels of firm-specific investments.
These assumptions of the Advocates may be illuminated by focusing
on the following non-shareholder constituencies: managers, creditors,
employees, and the community." The most vulnerable from that list
would seem to be small creditors" and employees, especially lowerlevel employees, where it is either impossible or irrational for them to
protect themselves fully through closely negotiated contractual terms or
covenants.
There is, of course, a way of protecting one's firm-specific capital
investment other than through complex contractual terms and expensive
covenants, and that is by pricing. An employee, for example, can protect a
firm-specific capital investment by demanding higher compensation to pay
accompanying textual discussion. The effect of the Advocates' rule is that the shareholders
are no longer the sole beneficiary of corporate managers' fiduciary duties. See supra note 66.
A system in which directors are obliged to act in the best interests of some combination of
corporate stakeholders while corporate officers, to whom the directors delegate the authority
to run the day-to-day operations of the corporation, are obliged to act only in the best interests
of shareholders would seem to be irrational, unintelligible, and unworkable.
So Blair & Stout, supra note i i, at 255 (noting their proposals "may ... provide an efficient
... solution" (emphasis added)); id. at 283 (concluding that corporate constituencies under
their regime "may in some cases gain more from constraining shirking and rent-seeking than
they lose to agency costs" (emphasis added)); id. at 284 ("[I3f the likely economic losses to a
productive team from unconstrained shirking and rent-seeking are great enough to outweigh
the likely economic losses from turning over decisionmaking power to a less-than-perfectlyfaithful hierarch, mediating hierarchy becomes an efficient second-best solution to problems
of team production." (emphasis added)). Individually, Professor Stout has stated that "the
question ultimately cannot be answered except on the basis of empirical evidence. . . . For
now, at least, I doubt that academics can provide a definitive answer." See Stout, supra note
I I, at 1201.

81 See supranote 76 and accompanying textual discussion.
82 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), the court refused to provide extra-contractual rights to lenders under a corporate indenture, due in part to the fact that the lenders were sophisticated financial institutions and thus
able to protect themselves by contractual terms. Id. at 1508.
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her for the risk of expropriation of her firm-specific investment. Some may
believe, contrary to the Advocates, that the availability of contractual terms
or covenants and pricing generally result in efficient outcomes between, for
example, employees and the company.'
It is, however, the third of the above factual assumptions that likely
will generate the most doubt. The Advocates' assumption is that a nonshareholder constituent who recognizes that his efficient firm-specific
investment may be vulnerable to expropriation will respond by refusing
to make the investment. This assumption seems questionable. Instead,
the more reasonable assumption-provided the investment is efficient (i.e.,
it creates economic value) and the non-shareholder constituent recognizes
the risk-may be that the member of the non-shareholder constituency
will search for ways to protect his investment, and in many cases there
is a likelihood that he will find ways to protect his investment for costs
that are less than the transaction costs he encounters in dealing with the
risk of expropriation. Specifically, once he recognizes the risk, he may see
the opportunity to generate gain for himself by making the firm-specific
investment and protecting himself by contract or pricing.
Consider the following illustration. Assume that I am a potential
employee and I have two job offers. Firm A offers me a job that has an
expected compensation of $100, and that job does not require me to
make firm-specific capital investment. Firm B offers me a job that has an
expected compensation of $120, but to take that job I have to make a firmspecific human capital investment of $10, say in training that would only
be useful within Firm B. Once I recognize in the Firm B job offer the risk
of expropriation, my rational response is to take the job in Firm B and then
spend up to $10 protecting myself either by contract or by pricing and thus
self-insuring. The point is that once I recognize that I am at risk-a fact
that is essential to the Advocates' claim that non-shareholder constituencies
will under-invest in firm-specific capital because of the risk-my rational
response seems likely to be to contract for protection or to self-insure,
unless the costs of those alternatives exceed the value of the difference
between the pay I receive in the two jobs. Dealing with a known risk by
refusing to engage in a value-creating transaction may seem an unlikely
response in most cases.
Another factual assumption that is necessary to support the gains
envisioned by the Advocates involves the incentives of directors operating

83 In Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the ContractatWill, 51 U. CHi. L. REV. 947 (1984),
the author discusses employment at will and the vulnerability of employees under that arrangement. He states that "we are dealing with the routine stuff of ordinary life; people who
are competent enough to marry, vote, and pray are not unable to protect themselves in their
day-to-day business transactions." Id. at 954. He adds that there is no "reason to believe that
such contracts are marred by misapprehensions, since employers and employees know the
footing on which they have contracted." Id. at 955.
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under their regime. The Advocates assume that once directors are free of
any legal duty to act in the best interests of shareholders, they will lose
their incentive to make decisions that benefit shareholders at the expense
of other non-shareholder constituencies and will become incentivized to
maximize the total value of the privileged constituencies as a whole.8
Once again, these factual assumptions seem problematic. Even if
directors are freed of any legalduty to act in the best interests of shareholders,
directors may still have strong economic incentives to make decisions that
benefit shareholders at the expense of non-shareholder constituencies.
The most obvious example is the fact that shareholders elect directors and
can vote them out of office if they choose." While scholars have rightfully
pointed out the difficulty shareholders have in removing displeasing
directors," the matter is a bit more complex.
The market for directors, as well as the directors themselves, may
measure a director's performance by the company's stock price. Thus, a
director's claim for additional compensation from his company" and his
ability to move up in the market for directors may well depend on his
success, as measured by the company's stock price.
A related point is that the directors themselves may be stockholders
and, especially in recent times, may hold stock options or restricted
stock, which they are awarded as a part of their compensation package."
This further adds to the incentive directors have to expropriate the firmspecific investments of non-shareholder constituencies for the benefit of
shareholders.
Finally, there is the matter of the market for corporate control. A low
stock price enhances the risk of a successful unfriendly takeover bid, which
will likely cost directors their jobs. As a result, directors operating under
the Advocates' regime will continue to have the incentive to increase stock
prices by expropriating value from non-shareholder constituencies for the
benefit of shareholders. Such expropriation will protect their control of the
company and the benefits of their directorships.
Even, therefore, with no legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth, there
remains a powerful and quite visible complex of incentives for directors to
grab rents and expropriate value on behalf of the company's shareholders.
84 See supratext accompanying notes 75-79.
85 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.o8(a) (2oo6).
86 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise,93 VA. L. REv. 675,
732 (2007) ("The shareholder franchise is largely a myth. Shareholders commonly do not
have a viable power to replace the directors.
87 Under the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT, directors set their own salaries. MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT § 8. Ii (2oo6).
88 See KORN/FERRY INT'L, 33RD ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY I8 (2oo6), available
at http://www.kornferry.com/Publication/3322 ("The vast majority (ninenty-four percent) of
FORTUNE
companies use equity as a portion of director compensation."); see, e.g., GEN.
ELEC. CO., SCHEDULE I4A, supra note 6o.

tooo

20IO-20II1

PROBLEMATIC PRINCIPLES

255

If that is the case, it seems unlikely that non-shareholder constituencies
will feel markedly more secure in a world in which directors are freed of
any legal obligation to act solely in the best interests of shareholders. Fully
informed non-shareholder constituencies may well perceive little change
in their vulnerability.
The Advocates also make a critical factual assumption regarding the
low costs of their regime. This assumption is necessary to support any final
factual reckoning that the economic costs of their regime are less than the
efficiency gains the regime generates.
The Advocates, certainly, make no claim that their regime changes the
inherent inclination of directors to act as rational maximizers in furtherance
of their own self-interests. 9 Thus, the net gain of the Advocates' regime
depends on an assumption that rational directors operating without a
mandate to act in the best interests of shareholders will not divert untoward
amounts of corporate value to themselves" or otherwise mismanage or
undermanage the corporation. Stated differently, the net benefit of the
Advocates' regime depends on the factual assumption that freeing directors
from any standards in this matter will not raise the agency costs associated
with the directors' function, at least not to an unacceptable level.
Sustaining this assumption is challenging, however, since the Advocates'
regime may generate significant agency costs by providing directors a
prodigious cover that enables them to pursue their own self-interests at the
expense of the corporation.
Consider two examples. First, assume that Target Corporation's board
receives an offer from Bidder Co. for the acquisition of Target at a 50%
premium over the current market price of Target's common stock. The
Advocates' regime provides a cover for self-interested acts by Target's
directors, who may be interested in protecting their directorships. The
Advocates' regime enables the Target directors to resist what appears to
be a value-enhancing overture, claiming that the proposed acquisition
jeopardizes the interests of the company's employees and creditors (if there
is a leveraged acquisition) and the community. Even in the face of an offer
that amounts to a large premium over market value-which would suggest
the acquisition will increase the economic value for the corporation as a
whole-the Advocates' regime makes it unlikely that a court would ever

89 See Blair & Stout, supra note i i, at 316.
90 As described earlier, the Advocates recognize that directors under their regime would
be subject to duty of loyalty requirements that would prohibit directors from transferring
wealth from other constituencies to themselves by stealing. See supra note 65 and accompanying textual discussion. The Advocates posit, however, that this may apply "to only a very
limited subset of all the possible situations" involving deep conflicts of interest. Blair &
Stout, supra note i i, at 299. This amounts to a significant limitation on the protection offered
by the duty of loyalty against directors' self-serving transactions. See infra notes 92 and 93 and
accompanying textual discussion.
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find such defensive actions culpable."
Consider another example involving the highly visible and contentious
issue of salaries for senior officers, particularly CEOs. The very heart of
the gains envisioned by the Advocates in their regime depends on the
unfettered right of a board of directors to allocate "rents" among the
privileged constituencies, and executive officers are always at the center
of such constituencies.9 2 As a result, the Advocates' regime would empower
a board-without any accountability or limitation-to shift essentially
unlimited amounts of corporate value to the CEO or other senior officers in
the form of compensation.93
These two simple examples suggest that the additional agency costs
of the Advocates' regime-especially when combined with a lax business
judgment rule-are significant. Directors operating under the Advocates'
regime would be free from the discipline generated by the threat of lawsuits
for their mismanagement and also would be substantially less vulnerable to
the discipline generated by the market for corporate control.
In summary, the Advocates' justification for their argument that
directors should be permitted to make unlimited wealth transfers among
corporate stakeholders depends on a number of factual assumptions that
seem problematic, including the following:
(1) That non-shareholder constituencies, recognizing their
vulnerability to expropriation of their firm-specific investments,
react by foregoing value creating trades;
(2) That managers, freed of any legal obligation to act only in the
best interests of shareholders, will no longer have a significant
incentive to take actions that benefit shareholders at the expense of
91 Imagine, for example, a situation in which the bidder offers a loo% premium for the
target's stock. Under the Advocates' regime, especially with an overlay of a lax duty of care
standard under the business judgment rule, it would seem unlikely that a court would find
that the directors violated their fiduciary duty by resisting the offer, if directors justify their
action as protecting other constituencies. Although Professors Blair and Stout would subject
directors to a duty to take actions that benefit the corporation as a whole, their view is that an
allocation of rents among competing constituencies "cannot be overturned by appealing to
some outside authority, like a court." Blair & Stout, supra note ii, at 284; id. at 289 (finding
directors' "fiduciary obligations ... run to the firm as a whole"); id. at 300 (arguing for liability
under the business judgment rule "only ... where a finding of liability serves the collective
interests of all the firm's members" (citation omitted)). Evaluated under a lax version of the
business judgment rule, it would be nearly impossible for complaining shareholders to meet
their heavy burden of proving that the judgment of the board to resist the unsolicited bid violates the board's duty of care. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying textual discussion.
92 The "joint welfare function" that defines the Advocates' regime consists "primarily
[ofl executives, rank-and-file employees, and equity investors." Blair & Stout, supra note ii, at
288 (emphasis added).
93 See id.at 288; see also id.at 284 (explaining that an allocation of rents among competing
constituencies "cannot be overturned by appealing to some outside authority, like a court").
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non-shareholder constituencies;
(3) That non-shareholder constituencies will recognize that managers
owe no legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth and will, as
a result, believe that managers will not make decisions that benefit
shareholders at their (non-shareholders') expense; and
(4) That directors, freed to make unlimited wealth transfers among
constituencies, will not use the rule as a cover for self-interested
actions, which include protection of their own jobs, unreasonably
high salaries for CEOs, and general undermanagement of the
company.
The net efficiency gains in the Advocates' regime depends on the
correctness of all of these assumptions. A close analysis of their assumptions
may suggest, however, that the likely outcome of the Advocates' regime is
quite different from what they intend.
CONCLUSION

A strong version of corporate fiduciary duties promotes efficient and
fair outcomes. Accountability on the part of corporate managers for their
actions and decisions is integral to achieving these good results. Without
a regime that includes strong fiduciary duties and accountability for the
full value of the economic loss that results from managers' actions and
decisions, achieving economic efficiency and fairness is less likely.
Society, however, seems no longer willing to enforce strong fiduciary
duties or to require accountability for the full economic loss generated by
corporate managerial misconduct.
Influential judges and scholars have provided the normative
justification for this remarkable deterioration in corporate fiduciary duties.
The justifications offered by Advocates for a weak fiduciary duty regime,
however, are based on multiple factual assumptions that flounder when
examined closely. The essential factual assumptions of the Advocates not
only are unproven empirically but also are counterintuitive and seem to get
only more factually improbable when unpacked and analyzed closely.
The arguments of the Advocates, therefore, fail to provide a sensible
basis for abandoning the economic notion that holding actors liable for
the full economic loss caused by their actions provides an incentive for
efficient conduct. The Advocates fail to meet the burden of demonstrating
a lax fiduciary duty regime promotes efficiency.

